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ABSTRACT 
Korean direct investment in China is on the rise since 1992 when the two 
countries established a diplomatic relation. Korean firms' confidence about China 
investment has also risen substantially as the business and investment environment in 
China improved owing to a series of government level agreements to protect the 
investments by private firms. The changes in the political relations between the two 
countries led to changes in the investment pattern by Korean firms. One of the major 
changes is a shift from small scale investments by small to medium sized export-
oriented companies to large scale investments by the conglomerates aiming at the 
China market. 
Direct investment in China not only presents great opportunities for many 
Korean firms which are seeking growth in market and reduction in cost, but also 
exposes Korean firms to numerous problems, as the history of Korean investment in 
China is very short and consequently the firms are less experienced. Some of the 
problems are common to firms from other countries, while the others are only 
applicable to Korean firms. 
This paper investigates the issues and patterns of Korean direct investments in 
China in an attempt to develop a strategy for successful investment. We first review 
the economic reforms and the foreign direct investment in China, and analyze the 
Korean direct investment in various dimensions such as location, size, and motivations. 
I used published data and a case study to identify potential problems, and a number of 
important factors for successful investment before making some recommendations. 
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China is moving forward fast under a socialist economic system. There had 
existed a certain limitation to Korean investors toward China as a destination until 
1992. Political, and economical uncertainties were the main cause, another was the 
lack of available information and experience. There was certainly Korean trade and 
investment before 1992, but these were indirect, through a third party, mostly Hong 
Kong, and minimal in terms of volume and number of projects. 
China became more attractive to Korean investors in 1992, following several important 
changes in Sino-Korean relations. A series of important events took place. Firstly, 
there was a mutual agreement on Sino-Korean trade in February, this was followed 
with agreement on investment protection in May, and finally normalization of 
diplomatic relations in August. These fast and significant changes between the two 
countries led Korean business people to consider business in China with a certain 
degree of confidence. The agreements in 1992 and the commencement of political ties 
boosted trade and direct investment in China. 
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Organization of This Report 
This report is composed of five chapters, three appendices, and bibliography. In 
chapter II, literature review on China's industrial reform, the side effects of the 
economic reforms, the development of foreign direct investment in China and the 
background of Korean direct investment in China is presented. General patterns of 
Korean investment are broken into two parts, before and after mid-1992( diplomatic 
normalization between the two countries ), and the problems Korean companies have 
been facing are discussed with a case study. This is followed by evaluation of Korean 
direct investment. Finally, opportunities and threats are presented in chapter IV. In 
chapter V, some recommendations are made based on the opportunities and threats to 
conclude this study. 
Objectives of This Studv 
The study has been done to : 
1) analyze industrial reforms in China 
2) identify patterns, and evaluate the performance ofKorean direct investment. 




This chapter begins by looking at industrial reform in China. It 
follows by presenting the side effects of the Chinese economic reforms, 
the development of foreign direct investment and finally the background 
ofKorean direct investment in China. 
Industrial Reform in China 
China had adopted an inward-looking economy policy that pursued self-
sufficiency for almost thirty years because of the UN embargo on trade with China, 
which was imposed in the early 1950s. The Chinese authorities realized that China's 
isolation was a big barrier to its economic development. 
The Chinese government announced "Four Modernization Programme", which 
included reforming the way the domestic economy was organized and the adoption of 
the so-called “open door" policy, in late 1978. They began in agriculture and were 
followed by modifications in industry. The program aimed at achieving the 
modernization of China by improving productivity and by utilizing imported capital 
equipment and technology. However, China had to generate foreign exchange 
necessary to pay for these imports by adopting export-oriented policy. 
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Since state sector, which includes a large proportion of China's industrial 
supply base, such as steel and iron, basic chemical, and so on, has played a most 
important role in China's economy, many measures have been introduced for large and 
medium-sized state-owned enterprises, and authorities have continuously modified the 
legal and organizational basis of these state enterprises. 
However, China's reform has been least successftil in the state-owned 
enterprises despite of their importance. These state-owned enterprises continues their 
inefficient ways, for example, rarely dismissing workers at unprofitable state 
companies( overmanning ), carrying poor quality control, undertaking high non-
operating expenditure( costs of local social service ), and operating under a non-
market price system.i Among the many problems of state companies, the outdated 
pricing system, which has been the most serious problem and has forced state 
companies to sell their products at politically driven( unrealistic ) prices, has made a 
large number of state companies operate in deficit. The following Table 2.1 shows the 
measures taken by the Chinese government to reform state-owned enterprises. The 
main purpose of reform in these enterprises was to reduce direct interference from 
government at all levels in the organizations in order to push them into being 
competitive so that enterprises gradually become independent commodity producers 
and operators responsible for their profits and losses, development and restraints? 
1 China 1994. Business Monitor International p 3. 
2 Keun Lee, "Property rights and the agency problem in China's enterprise reform". 
Cambridge Joumal ofEconomics,17, 1993, pp 179-194. 
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Table2.1 
Reforms of State-owned Enterprises 
Measures Description 
Early 1980s Initial profit retention • Allowed enterprises to retain a share of 
their profit. 
• A bonus system was introduced to 
improve productivity 
Mid-1980's Contracted management • Allowed firms to replace production 
system, and Manager targets with responsibility contracts that 
responsibility system allowed them to retain any surplus after 
Mf i l l ing specific production targets and 
financial obligation. 
• Managers were given high autonomy in 
decision-making. 
• Caused a short-term oriented investment 
behavior during contract period and 
inefficient resource allocation among 
enterprises 
• Strong control and interference of the 
state remained 
Late 1980's Shareholding system • Initially aimed at removing the state's 
strong control( separate ownership from 
^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ control rather than funding) 
Sources: Property Rights and the Agency Problems in China's Enterprise Reform, 
Cambridge Joumal ofEconomics, 1993, 17’ pp 179-194. 
Table 2.2 
Industrial Growth and Structure 
Types of firm 1992 output share Annual real growth 
( percentage ) 1980-1991 ( percentage ) 
State 484 7 ^ 
^ollective^ — 38.2 18.6 
Private ^ 140.6 
Other 6.6 43.5 “ 
Tota l 100.0 12.8 
Sources : Statistical Yearbook of China's Industrial Economy, 1992 
pp 34, 36 and Statistical Survey ofChina, 1993, p 70. 
3 Collective is a type of commercial entities in China. They are mainly composed of 
purchasing and marketing co-operatives in villages and towns, and co-operative shops 
in the cities. 
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Despite the slow growth rate and inefficient control of state companies, the 
overall performance of Chinese industry has been improved as a result of increased 
competition by other entities such as collectives, private, and foreign enterprises, and a 
gradual shift from a planned economy to a market economy. As shown in Table 2.2, 
the private sector filled with entrepreneurial spirit and high operational efficiency, and 
collectives recorded the highest and second highest annual real growth rate form 1980 
to 1992. This implies that Chinese industry is becoming far removed from the 
traditional centrally controlled, and state dominated sector. 
The Side Effects of the Reforms 
Under the "socialist market economy" system the Chinese economy has 
undergone fast changes such as in the growth rate, and, to some extent, shifted from 
state control to an economy driven by market forces. In terms of performance, China 
has achieved a high growth rate. From 1980 to 1993 its GDP grew at an average rate 
of 9.4% annually, making China one of the fastest growing economies in the world. 
However, it seems that China can only maintain this growth in the future by 
solving the serious problems created from the reform process over more than a decade. 
In this section, those serious problems are presented. 
Unbalanced Development among Regions 
Disparity in terms of economic growth among the provinces has been a 
worrying side-effect for the Chinese government. As shown in Table 2.3, many 
provinces, especially inland provinces, have benefited much less from the reforms.^ 
However, some inner provinces enjoyed special circumstances, such as those with an 
24 China 1994, Business Monitor International Ltd. 1994, pp 128-130. 
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accessible supply of raw materials or existing major enterprises which enjoy a domestic 
monopoly or are able to produced goods in demand at competitive prices. 
As Central government allowed provincial government a high level of 
autonomy over economic decision-making in their, so-called "decentralization"or “ 
regionalization” policy, the gap has been even greater. The provinces along the coast 
were better places for foreign companies to invest because of relatively well-
established infrastructure, easy access to transportation and strong support of the 
provincial governments. In addition, one of the many reform strategies was to start 
development of the coastal areas that were already comparatively rich, and to expand 
the “ripple effect of development" to the inner and border areas. Therefore, many 
SEZs were, at first, designated in such areas to attract foreign capital and technology 
in 1980, and became the centers of the economic reform. 
Table 2.3 
Ten Fastest Growing Provincial Economies 
Provinces 1993 GNP/GDP 1992 GNP/GDP 1992 ranking 
growth (o/o) growth (%) 
Fujian 2 ^ 2 ^ 4 — 
Zhejiang 25.0 “ 18.9 “ 6 
Shandong 24.2 — 19.5 — 5 
Hainan 22.8 23.3 2 
Anhui ~ 22.0 — 17.4 — 8 
Guangdong 2 ^ 22.0 — 3 
Guangxi 19.6 — 18.3 — 7 
Jiangsu 18.5 — 26.5 — 1 
Hebei 16.5 — 13.9 11 
Jiangxi — 15.8 一 15.4 — 9 
China 13.4 13.Q 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1993. 
Note : 1993 growth rate data were not available for Jilin, Hunan and Heilongjiang, which 
respectively recorded 13.0，12.3, and 6.6% GNP growth in 1992. 
8 
Unbalanced Growth among Industries 
As shown in Table 2.4, despite its important role in terms of production, 
exports and employment( labor force in the agricultural sector was 58.7% of total ), 
agriculture's share of the total output is decreasing. In contrast, industrial output has 
increased significantly since the beginning of the economic reform. However, there has 
been disparity in the speed of development between different sectors( light vs heavy 
industry, and non-state vs state-owned sector ). Other sectors such as service, finance 
and transportation have to grow to achieve balanced economic growth. 
Table 2.4 
Breakdown of Gross Domestic Product by Industry 
( % share, based on price at 1994 ) 
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Primary industry 30.4 — 28.4 26.1 23.9 21.2 
Secondary industry 49.0 4 ^ 45.0 — 48.2 51.8 — 
Construction 43 4.8 — 5.0 6.1 — 6.7 
Tertiary industry 20.6 一 28.0 28.9 — 27.9 27.0 
Transport 4.6 — 6.3 — 6.3 5.8 — 5.3 一 
j:ommerce 4.5 4.7 6.2 — 5.9 N/A 
Sources : China Statistical Yearbook, 1993 and the State Statistical Bureau. 
High Inflation 
Thirdly, as indicated in figure 2.1, the high inflation rate has been a problem 
since 1984, because of rising demand outstripping the overall wealth created, an 
increase in money supply, foreign capital inflow, and the credit boom in 1993. In 
particular, the ESZs and coastal areas have been experiencing the highest inflation rate. 
This is because of the speed of their development. This inflation problem has, from 
time to time, eased for short periods at the expense of slowing economic growth and 
investment growth without a general macro-economic tool. 
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Figure 2.1 
Real GNP Growth Rate and Inflation 
25 |.._._._._..„^ ^ 
. 2 0 f ^ / 
5 15- / \ / RealGNP 
§ l o / — 、 、 \ i , growthrate 
o 、、 \ ^,^.-..-^*' Urban inflation 
^ 5- N . , . V ^ rate 
0 fmrnf^mfmw^^^ 
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Year 
Sources : EIU Country Forecast 1st quarter 1994 ( The Economist Intelligence 
Unit Limited, 1994 ), pp. 18, 19. 
Another factor that helped cause the high inflation rate was the inflexible 
interest rate policy. Given that interest rates in China are administratively set by the 
government, they do not respond to changes in the demand and supply of funds, and 
thus, tend to lag behind inflation. As shown in figure 2.2, negative real interest rates 
encouraged people to pull their savings out of the banks, and either invest their money 
in unregulated channels like illegal investment companies, where higher interest rates 
were offered. The inflexible interest rate certainly increased money supply and helped 
to increase the inflation rate. 
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Figure 2.2 
Falling Real Interest Rates, and Money Supply in the PRC 
% per year 
30 r^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ •^.••.•.^•.•.^ .^^•.^•.•.^•^ •.•.•.^•^ ^^ •^ ._._._._._._._._,_._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._.,_j 
20 Nflationrat^  ^ ^ ^ \ Money supply growth (year-on-year %) 
10.[ _ j 2 > ^ ^ 1992 1993 1994 
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0 -?¾?^^^ :r." 、.： ； Currency in circulation 36.4 35.3 24.3 
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Source : China Statistical Yearbook and China Financial Outlook 
Note : The figure in left-hand side does not indicate the exact values of inflation and real interest 
rate. It is only for comparative purpose. 
Reliance on Foreign Investment 
Another problem is increasing reliance on foreign investment? Foreign 
investment has played an important role in building up china's export sector and 
accelerating growth in many areas of the country. Although foreign-fiinded ventures 
accounted for a relatively small proportion of overall production, they occupied 27.5% 
of overall exports in 1993, a slight increase from 26.4% in 1992. However, the figure 
increased to 37% in 1994. This indicates that China's economy could be vulnerable i f 
the foreign inflows fell away. The government is seeking some adjustment by 
exploiting domestic capital more but this can not yet substitute for foreign investment. 
Capital Allocation 
Finally, there had been a problem in allocating capital before the new Central 
Bank Law promulgated in March 1995 in China. Each year banks in China are 
24 China 1994, Business Monitor International Ltd. 1994, pp 128-130. 
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allocated quotas on the amount of credit they can offer by the People's Bank ofChina( 
PBOC ). The headquarters of the commercial banks in turn distribute quotas to their 
branches in China. 
However, additional credit was very often offered by banks without approval 
of the central bank. In addition, credit was often allocated to unproductive areas. The 
failure of the banks to effectively distribute their credit to productive sectors helped 
cause problems in the state-enterprise reform. Under the current system, the 
government is supposed to bail out loss-making state-owned enterprises( state-owned 
enterprises are not accountable for their own losses ). For example, in 1993 the 
government spent RMB 41 billion( 10% of tax revenue ) on subsidizing loss-making 
enterprises. This resulted in a worse situation in the state-owned sector in terms of 
productivity and capital allocation. Under the new system, PBOC is monitoring the 
banks to prohibit credit extension. 
Development of Foreign Direct Investment 
This section is broken down into six subsections to look at foreign direct 
investment. They are role of foreign direct investment in China, three stages of FDI 
development in China, foreign direct investment by types of investment , by country, 
by distribution, and finally summary of the major countries' direct investment in China. 
Role of Foreign Direct Investment in China 
Foreign direct investment has developed under the Four Modernization 
Programme in line with the better business environment in China. As discussed 
previously, to improve overall industry standards, authorities had to attract foreign 
assistance. The year 1992 and 1993 saw a huge increase in the amount of foreign 
12 
investment in China. The figures were much higher than in previous years. Foreign 
investment has played an important role in the development of China by supplying 
technology, contributing to the huge increase in China's export, and creating job 
opportunities for local people. 
Figure 2.3 
Foreign Direct Investment in China 
US$ Million Year ^ . AnZ Amt. 
120000 contracted utilized 
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Source : Ministry ofForeign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the PRC 
In the early nineties, as shown Figure 2.4 below, foreign-invested companies 




Share ofForeign Investment in China's Trade 
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Source : The figure 2.4 is based on data from the State Statistical Bureau and the 
Ministry ofForeign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the PRC, 1994. 
Three Stages of FDI Development in China 
Basically, special treatment has been given to investment which matches the 
current development strategy and industrial priorities. In other words, investment 
focusing on the production of goods for export and which introduces advanced 
technology has benefited mostly from the tax systems and by incentives. China re-
evaluates its laws and regulations related to FDI on a continuous basis as the situation 
in China changes. For instance, China relaxed export ratios of foreign funded 
enterprises in the high-tech industry so they could market a certain portion of its 
products processed in China for sale. The reform process might be broken down into 
three stages according to different strategies and policies adopted by the Chinese 
government, 
6 Pyung Seup-Yang, Jong Sek-An. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment Policy and 
_Kore^ Direct Investment in China. CAS, Dec. 1992’ pp. 29-32. 
T ® W , 安 鐘 石 . 中 國 外 國 人 直 接 投 資 誘 致 政 策 到 變 化 碎 韓 國 到 對 中 函 
投資.對外經濟政策研究院,Dec.l992.) “ 
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First stage : 1979 � 1 9 8 5 
This period was mainly to create foundations such as an attractive environment, 
and laws and regulations related to investment. China first opened its door to foreign 
investors in Guangdong and Fujian province in 1980, by creating four SEZs. Most 
investments came from Hong Kong and were limited to the four SEZs. 
The first direct investment boom began in 1984 as there emerged more formulated 
laws and regulations on Joint Venture, and more cities were opened to outsiders. In 
1984，China opened Coastal Economic Open Zones( CEOZ ) and Economic and 
Technological Development Zones( ETDZ ) in 14 coastal cities to attract investment 
involving new technology and producing high-quality consumer goods. Most foreign 
investments were focused on service industries such as hotel, tourism, restaurant, etc. 
from 1984 to 1985. 
Second stage : 1986 � s e c o n d quarter of 1989 
During the second stage, the focus of foreign investment switched from the 
service industry to the manufacturing industry. The Chinese government put high 
restrictions on investment in the service sector, and assembly operations making 
relatively unsophisticated semi-finished commodities. Abundant money supply and 
increasing import of necessary materials and consumer goods to meet high 
consumption rate and overheated investments caused a rapid decrease of foreign 
reserves in China. Strong measures were taken to tighten foreign exchange. As a 
result, the number of contracts and capital invested dropped significantly in 1986. 
The second boom arose in 1988 due to the government decision to allow 
flexible labor control, and permission of participation in domestic market for the 
foreign companies involved in high technology and export, the selected products, etc. 
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The economy continued its growing trend until the Tiananman square massacre 
occurred. 
Third stage : third quarter of 1989 � n o w 
In late 1988, the government sharply tightened credit availability in response to 
the overheated economy, high inflation, and a deterioration in the trade balance as 
exports grew more slowly and import accelerated. In addition, the Tiananman square 
massacres in Jun. 1989 resulted in the deterioration of the domestic economy and an 
unstable business environment. The total number of projects and total amount of 
investments dropped by 8% and 22% respectively in first half of 1990 compared to the 
same period of 1989.? 
However, the reversal of the 1988 austerity measures and the commitment to 
faster economic reform, following Deng Xiaoping's visit to Guangdong, made China's 
business environment more attractive and raised expectations of further improvements. 
Starting from the second half of 1990, foreign direct investment in China again surged 
drastically due to the international environment turned in China's favor, for example, 
the extension of the MFN status, abolition of the economical embargo by EC nations. 
As tight money policy was lifted, investment surged and reforms were speeded up. In 
1992, the government decided to establish the Pudong Special Economic Zone, on a 
largely green field site to the east of the Huangpu river, for foreign investments similar 
to a SEZ.8 The area was designed not only to further develop Shanghai but also to set 
up fundamentals for gradual development along the Yangze River delta. Also in 1992, 
four additional cities were designated open coastal cities- Heihe and Suifenhe ( 
7 Pyung Seup-Yang, Jong Sek-An. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment Policy and 
Korean Direct Investment in China. CAS, Dec. 1992, p31. 
24 China 1994, Business Monitor International Ltd. 1994, pp 128-130. 
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Heilongjiang ), Huchun ( Jilin ) and Manzhouli ( Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
) - w i t h a view to building on the cross-border trade which was taking place. In 
contrast, the central government cracked down on 1,000 out of an estimated 1,200 
unauthorized investment areas in 1993. 
However, rising inflation rates and the deterioration in the balance of trade 
through early 1993 led to the imposition of a short-lived austerity measure in the third 
quarter of the year.^ In late 1993, with the relaxed policy, the GDP growth rate and the 
inflation rate were 13.4%, and 13% respectively. The high inflation again came from 
the increased money supply, and shortage raw material due to the upsurging 
investment. The Chinese government has again used the tight monetary policy and 
reduced incentives for foreign investors in order to maintain sustainable growth rate 
and inflation rate, since 1994. 
Types of Foreign Direct Investment 
As shown in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.5, equity joint ventures were the most 
popular, occupying 63.5% of the total, followed by wholly foreign-owned company 
and contractual joint venture, 21.3% and 15.3% respectively. This is because 
requirements for setting up an equity joint venture are somewhat less than those for 
other types of business and forming an equity joint venture provides foreign investors 
with other advantage such as easy access to the Chinese market by using their local 
partner's existing channels. 
9 "Stability is priority", Asian Business, August 1994, pp 26-27. 
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Table 2.5 Figure 2.5 
FDI, 1979 to 1994, by Type Percentage ofInvestment by Type 
Type No. of Amt. of Realized o.1 % Joint development 
projects contracts Amt. ^ ^ - T * ^ 
g j s m ) (us$bii) wFOE 广 H 
^ ^ ^ : : : 急 _ 
Contractual Joint 33,879 77.362 20.672 ^ ^ ^ ^ M 
- f e ： ^ ^ ^ 5 T - ^ ^ _ 
Joint 113 4.001 4.439 
Development 
Source : The Bank ofKorea. 
Distribution of FDI by Country 
As shown Table 2.6, due to ethnic ties and geographic proximity to China, 
Hong Kong has played a leading role in foreign investment, followed by Taiwan, USA 
and Japan. This is partly because a lot of foreign investment in China was directed 
through Hong Kong by using their subsidiaries in Hong Kong. 
Table2.6 
Foreign Direct Investment by Country( cumulative totals ) 
(US$ in billion., by the end of 1993，and figures are rounded ) 
Country Contract investment Realized investment 
Amount % of total Amount % oftotal 
~ U o n g Kong — 147.27 67.9 “ 38.51 68.2 
Taiwan 18.43 8.5 — 5.04 8.9 
USA — 14.65 6.6 — 5.77 10.2 
Japan 8.93 — 4.1 — 5.19 一 9.2 — 
Others 27.63 12.7 — 1.97 一 3.5 
Total 216.91 100.0 56.48 100.0 — 
Source : Ministry ofForeign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
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Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment by Industry 
The manufacturing industry has traditionally been the main attraction to foreign 
investment. The use of cheap labor and tax incentives for foreign investors( especially 
export-oriented ) in China have been the main reasons for them doing business in 
China. However, as per capita income and consumption grew, and restrictions on the 
consumer market eased, the trend of many foreign manufacturers in China began 
shifting toward marketing their products to the domestic market. In addition, as labor 
costs have become higher( especially in the developed areas ), more investment is now 
being directed into capital and technology-intensive industry. 
As the Chinese government has started gradually opening the infrastructure 
sector to foreign investors by implementing the BOT( Build-Operate-Transfer ) 
system on an experimental basis, such as in the energy, telecommunication, and 
transportation f i e l d s . The number of projects in the construction of power plants and 
transportation facilities has increased steadily. ( Table 2.7 ) 
In addition, foreign investment in the retailing, and service sectors such as finance, 
consulting and property has increased. 
10 This is system where foreign companies gradually transfer technology in 
manufacturing and management skills to the Chinese in return for profits during 
operations. Trade with China and Introduction to Investment in China. KOTRA, Sep. 
1995, p 1 8 5 . (對中國交易漠投資案内 .韓國貿易協會，S e p . l 9 9 5 . ) 
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Table 2.7 
Distribution ofForeign Direct Investment by Industry 
(US$ in bil l ion) 
Industry 1978〜88 1989〜91 1992 ]99} 1994 
Tota l 28.165(100) 24.173(100) 58.124(100) 111.436(100) 82.680(100) 
Agriculture 0.906(3.2) 0.463(1.9) 0.678(1.2) 1.191(1.1) 0.972(1.2) 
Manufacturing industry 13.388(47.5) 19.855(82.1) 32.667(56.2) 51.174(45.9) 43.899(53.1) 
Construction 0.483(1.7) 0.382(1.6) 1.839(3.2) 3.878(3.5) 2.394(2.9) 
Transportation and 0.390(1.4) 0.183(0.8) 1.543(2.7) 1.490(1.3) 2.030(2.5) 
Telecommunication 
Service industry 1.510(5.4) 0.348(1.4) 1.444(2.5) 4.606(4.1) 3.922(4.7) 
Property and Mrastructure 7.985(28.4) 2.480(10.3) 18.080(31.1) 43.771(39.3) 23.862(28.9) 
development 
Others 3.503(12.4) 0.462(1.9) 1.873(3.2) 5.326(4.8) 5.601(6.8) 
Source : Ministry ofForeign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 
Summary of Investment by Other Countries 
Many countries such as US, Japan, Taiwan, and European countries have 
actively participated in China's economic reforms since 1979. The patterns established 
and the motivations of such countries are somewhat different from those of Korean( 
Korean investment is discussed later in this chapter and in the next chapter ). Figure 
2.6 below shows Shanghai and Guangdong were the most attractive locations, and 
market development and China's economic potential were the major reasons for being 
attracted to invest in China among foreign investors. 
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Figure 2.6 
Main Attractive Cities and Reasons for Being Attracted to Invest in China 
Shandong E 1 F； 
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Source : EKJ 
Note : The figures were made based on the survey done to delegates attending the Economist 
Conferences 
U.S.A 
1) A large number of equity Joint Ventures 
A few US companies set up equity joint ventures with local partners to establish 
"guanxi" with local government and penetrate the domestic market. As shown in 
Table 2.8, equityjoint venture occupied a dominant portion, about 76%. 
Table2.8 
Types ofDirect Investment by US Companies, 1979 to 1989 
Type No. of project Percentage Amount Percentage 
(US$ in million.，％) 
Equity JV 724 76.0 U ^ 29^6 
Contractual JV 155 m 1,243 3L0 
WFOE ^6 ^ 336 ^ 
Others ^ 3^ 1 ^ 3LS 
Sources : China Economy, JETRO, 1991 Jul., p 27. 
2) Multinational companies and balanced geographical dispersion. 
A large number of companies are located in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, etc., followed by the provinces along the coast. Surprisingly, US 
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companies shows a strong presence in the inner provinces. In addition, A large 
number of investors are multinational companies such as Motorola, GM, Coca-
Cola, Continental Grain, etc. 
Japanii 
1) China as a new destination for direct investment 
Small and medium-sized Japanese investors had led Japanese investment until the 
late 1980s. Japanese companies, especially those involved in the light labor-
intensive industries have turned their investment interests from MEs and ASEAN 
countries to China due to the worsening domestic investment environment. From 
the late 1989, however, Japanese large corporations have been attracted by China's 
relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment. 
2) Market-oriented investment 
As indicated in Table 2.9, 44.4% of Japanese companies were market-oriented, 
which indicates that they focused on penetrating the Chinese markets rather than 
pursuing cost advantages. 
Table 2.9 
Japanese Motivation toward China 
Motivation Jul. 1986 Mar. 1989 
China's huge potential market 50 (27.0) 31 (27.0) 
Establishment of company image 22 (13.4) 12 (10.4) 
Reaction to China's - 8 (7.0) 
protectionism 
Cheap labor 15 (9.1) 19(16.5) 
Natural resources 13 (7.9) 8 (7.0) . 
Requestfrom China 53 (32.3) 23 (20.0) Sources : China 
Competitors' movement to China 8 (4.9) 4 (3.5) Economy. 
others 4 (1.8) 10 (8.7) JETRO, Apr. 
No. ofcompanies surveyed 161(100.0) 115(100.0) — 1990. 
11 Pyung Seup-Yang, Jong Sek-An. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment Policy and 
Korean Direct Investment in China. CAS, Dec. 1992, pp 46-54, and China Economy. 
JETRO, Apr. 1990. ‘ 
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3) High density ofJapanese firms in big cities and coastal areas. 
The cities and Shandong province in the gulf of Pohai have the highest density of 
Japanese companies( 31% of the total ), followed by Southeast China( 19.4% ), east 
coast China( 26.9% ), and the three north-eastern provinces( 14.3% ). From the 
early 1990s, Japanese investment in Liaoning province, beginning in Dalian, has 
risen sharply. 
4) Wide distribution of industry 
The manufacturing industry has been the major attraction to Japanese investors. 
However, with China's opening of its consumer market to foreign investment, 
investment in the service sector such as in the distribution, retail, and transportation 
areas began surging from 1989( Table 2.10 ). 
Table2.10 
Distribution of Japanese Investment by Industry 
(Un i t : Percentage) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1974- 1991 
Manufacturing 68.4 68.7 67.5 47.3 68.5 46.9 66.9 49.2 59.8 26.2~ 
Non-manufacturing 31.0 31.3 31.7 52.7 30.9 53.1 33.1 50.8~~402~~73.8 
Sources : Financial Statistic Report, 1991, Dec. 
Note : In 1988，68.4% of total No. of projects were in the manufacturing industry as was 68.7% 
of total amount invested. 
Taiwan^^ 
As political tension between China and Taiwan eased and economic ties grew 
stronger, Taiwanese companies' participation in the Chinese market surged 
significantly. In 1991, Taiwan held second position in terms of the No. and amount of 
foreign projects in China. 
12 Pyung Seup-Yang, Jong Sek-An. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment Policy and 
Korean Direct Investment in China. CAS, Dec. 1992, pp 55-66. 
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1) High density ofTaiwanese companies in South China. 
Guangdong and Fujian are the leading provinces in terms ofthe No. and amount of 
Taiwanese projects. This is especially, due to the fact that 45% of the total 
Taiwanese population are Fujian natives and that its location is close, the province 
is very popular with the Taiwanese. 
2) A large number ofcompanies involved in labor-intensive manufacturing industry. 
Investment was mostly composed of small capital and concentrated in labor-
intensive industries such as plastics, electronics, and footwear. Since the early 
1990s, however, the portion of Taiwanese investment in the capital-intensive 
industries such as, real estate, tourism, and financial industries has increased. 
3) Short payback period and export-oriented. 
The Taiwanese common trend , because of possible political instability in the future, 
was to pursue a quick return strategy, say, within 2 to 3 years. In addition, firms 
exported products, processed using China's cheap labor plus Taiwan's capital and 
skill, to Hong Kong, US, etc. In respect to the type of investment, wholly-owned 
enterprises occupied a slightly higher portion of the total investment( 56% ) than 
equity and contractual joint ventures( 44% ). 
24 
Background of Korean Investment in China 
In this section, motivations of direct investment by Korean companies into 
China are briefly presented. 
Motivations of Direct Investment by Korean Companies 
High labor costs 
The annual rate of Korea's economic growth, on average, has been very high. 
Among the factors that have contributed to growth are a high level of education and 
training, and cheap but high quality labor. 
The national economy shifted from having a labor surplus to having a labor 
shortage. The labor shortage began in rural areas in about 1975. Consequently, real 
wages started to increase sharply around this time( Table 2.11)/^ 
Table2.11 
Productivity and Wages, 1972-1988 
Labor Productivity Nominal Wages Real Wages 
Lidex Growth Index Growth Lidex Growth 
T ^ r ^ rate 
1975 58.6 11.6 —26.2 27.0 ~57.9 1.4 
1976 ~62.8 12 ~35.2 34.7 ~67.6 16.8 
1977 69.6 10.8 —47.2 33.8 82.2 21.5 
1978 ~78.0 12.1 63.3 34.3 ~96.5 17.4 
1979 “ 90.3 15.8 81.5 28.6 104.9 8.7 
1980 100.0 10.7 100.0 21.1 “ 100.0 -4.7 
1981 ‘ 118.1 18.1 120.1 20.1 99.0 -1.0 
1985 —171.1 7.1 l83.8 9.9 130.4 7.3 
1988 262.0 14.9 268.2 19.7 167.8 11.8 
Sources : Nak Song-Byung, The Rise of the Korean Economy. Oxford University 
Press, Warwick House, Hong Kong, 1990, p 74. 
13 Nak Song-Byung. The Rise of the Korean Economy. Oxford University Press, 
Warwick House, Hong Kong, 1990, pp 76-77. 
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Labor-related problems became a hot issue from 1987，shortly after 
government announced the liberalization of labor relations on Jun. 29. Confrontation 
between management and labor union became widespread cross the country. As a 
result, wages of manufacturing workers rose to about the same level as those of 
Korea's major competitors-Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Companies, especially 
small and medium-sized, in Korea were no longer able to benefit from low labor costs 
in Korea. 
Industrial restructuring 
Other than labor-related problems, industrial restructuring became inevitable 
due to factors such as strong challenges from other developing countries and pressure 
from advanced countries in the domestic market because of the open door policy 
driven by government, stemming from a large trade surplus, and trade barriers.^^ 
China was not a major destination of Korean companies before late 1980s due 
to the absence of political ties. As 1988 the Seoul Olympic helped improving Sino-
Korean relations by increasing unofficial contact, China became an attractive place for 
overseas investment, especially for small and medium-sized exporters involved in the 
light industry such as footwear, textiles, toys, electronics and electronic components, 
and machinery. Companies involved in labor-intensive operations were eager to be 
cost-leaders by taking advantage of China's cheap labor. 
As detailed in the figures below in 1992 alone, more than 269 investment 
projects worth US$ 222 million bounded to China. This figure exceeded the entire 
amount the period prior to 1991( Figure 2.8, and 2.9 ). 
14 Pyung Seup-Yang. Jong Sek-An. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment Policy and 
Korean Direct Investment in China. CAS, Dec. 1992, pp 67-72. 
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Figure 2.8 
Korean Direct Investment in China 
(Number, US$ in million) 
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Figure 2.9 
Korean Direct Investment Worldwide 
(Number, US$ in million) 
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This study is done by the following two methods 
1) Gathering of information and statistical data 
2) Case study 
Gathering of Information and Statistical Data 
This report uses data gathered from a number of different sources, which are 
interpreted with a view to understanding Korean direct investment in China in depth. 
However there is certainly a limitation. In some cases, they are conflicted in terms of 
numerical values. For the purpose of the study, data from the most reliable sources 
have been selected. 
The different sources are : 
1) various business publications such as Business China, China Business Review, 
China Economic Review, etc. 
2) various sources of data such as government report and company report published 
in Korean or English. 
3) newspaper cuttings. 
4) various books published related to the topic. 
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Case Studv 
A Korean textile company was selected in order to study the operations of 
Korean companies in China. The company was selected for three main reasons. First of 
all, the textile industry contributes a large portion of the total Korean direct investment 
in China. Secondly, the company located its joint venture in Jilin, which is one of the 
most popular areas for Korean investors, and, finally, the joint venture was established 
just after diplomatic normalization between the countries. 
The case study has been done based on an interview with the CEO of the 
Korean company. 
Note 
South or North Korea are not specified in this report, Korea always indicates 
The Republic ofKorea( South Korea ). 
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CHAPTER TV 
KOREAN D m E C T EVVESTMENT JN Cff lNA 
This chapter first presents the general patterns of Korean direct 
investment in China during two periods. This is followed by identifying 
problems that Korean companies have been facing and the case study is 
presented based on an interview with the CEO of the company. Then, 
Korean investment is evaluated. Finally, opportunities and threats are 
presented. 
It was in about 1987 that South Korea began trading directly with China( 
before 1987, trade was mainly through Hong Kong ). By 1990 South Korea became 
China's fifth-largest trading partner, and China became South Korea's fourth largest/^ 
Trade between South Korea and China had grown rapidly, and Korea recorded its first 
trade surplus with China in 1993( Figure 4.1 ). 
Along with the increasing trade, Korean direct investment in China has also 
increased. Korean direct investment may be broken down into the two periods, before 
and after normalization of Sino-Korean relations in mid-1992. 
15 Rechard Pomfret, "Pragmatic partners.” China Trade Report. Jun., 1992, p 6. 
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Figure 4.1 
South Korea's Trade with China, 1988-1995 
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Source: The Bank ofKorea 
Note : The 1995 figure is for the period of January - July. 
General Patterns of Korean Investment in China 
In this section, five issues are presented in the two different periods. They are 
objective, type, size, region, and distribution ofKorean direct investment. 
Korean Direct Investment before Mid-1992 
In the period from 1985 to mid-1992, in spite of the absence of diplomatic ties 
between the two countries, they increased unofficial access to create a favorable 
environment for their economic ties. However, the absence of diplomatic relations 
forced Korean investors to face special difficulties in getting the necessary visas, 
securing legal protection, etc. Projects were negotiated and agreements were reached 
indirectly through third countries( mainly subsidiaries in Hong Kong ). This caused 
additional costs, complicated and time-consuming processes and legal ambiguity. The 
number and amount of projects for this period were 282 and US$ 250 million 
respectively. 
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Objective of China proiects 
The major motivation for most Korean companies was to take advantage of 
cheap labor. They imported a large portion of their materials from Korea and exported 
end-products, manufactured using cheap labor, to Korea, and other overseas markets. 
Because of its lower transportation costs and shorter lead times, compared to 
Southeast Asian countries, China was suitable for them to choose as an export-
launching platform. 
Size of investment 
Other than a few large conglomerates who made large investments, most 
companies invested less than US$1 million in China( Table 4.1 ). This was because of 
the short history of Korean investment in China, the lack of information about China, 
and uncertainty over legal framework and protection due to the fact that agreement on 
investment had not been established between the two countries. Therefore, small and 
medium size companies with high production costs in Korea moved their production 
lines simply to cut their labor costs in order to be more competitive. Until the big 
turning point in mid-1992 when diplomatic ties between the two countries were 
normalized, market development, technology transfer, and big projects were of less 
interest to Korean manufacturers. 
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Table 4.1 
Size ofKorean Direct Investment 
Less than US$~~US$ 1,000,000 US$ 2,000,000 More than US$ 
hidustry 1,000,000 �1，999，999 �4，999，999 5000,000 
No. of projects No. of projects No. of projects No. of projects 
Manufacturing 201 35 13 7 
Food 15 1 1 NA 
Textile 60 9 3 NA 
Footwear and Leather 18 9 3 2 
Lumber and Furniture 12 NA NA NA 
Pulp and Printing 3 1 NA NA 
Chemical 2 2 NA 1 
Nonmetallic mineral 5 1 NA NA 
Metallic product 11 2 NA 1 
Electronic components 13 6 4 NA 
Machinery 7 1 1 1 
Others ^ 2 2 2 
Non-manufacturing 18 5 1 1 
Agriculture NA 1 NA NA 
Mining 4 NA NA NA 
Fishery 7 3 1 NA 
Restaurant 5 1 NA 1 
Transportation 1 NA NA NA 
Trade 1 ^ ^ NA 
Total ^ 40 Is 8 
Source : The Bank ofKorea 
Type of investment 
It tumed out that Korean companies( mostly small and medium size ) running 
businesses in China generally preferred to establish wholly-owned companies( Table 
4.2 ). As stated before, labor costs were the major attraction for companies operating 
in China. A large number of companies wanted to set up a triangular trade system, 
which means companies wanted to handle their marketing, secure raw materials, and 
finance arrangements in Seoul and simply manufacture their products for re-export. 
Korean companies had to maintain strong control over their manufacturing 
subsidiaries in China. In order to achieve this, they established wholly-owned 
companies to avoid the possible problems of joint ventures with Chinese partners. 
However, companies relying on resources in China such as companies in the food, and 
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petrochemical industries, and most large corporations preferred to set up joint 
ventures. ^ ^ 
Table 4.2 
Shareholding Percentage ofKorean Companies until Jun. 1992 
(No. of contacts) 
fShareholding ~ Lessthan5Q% 50% 51~99% 100% Total 
pNo. ofcontractT 36 52 61 — 133 282 
fTercentage 12.8% 18.4% 21.6% 47.2% 100% 
Source : The Bank ofKorea and Korea Trade Association( KOTRA). 
Location 
The Korean companies that invested in China had focused on the north-eastern 
provinces and the gulf ofPohai whereas other foreign companies had set up operations 
in the Southeast and East coastal areas/?( Figure 4.2 and 4.3 ) The most preferred 
cities were Tsingdao in Shandong province, Shenyang in Liaoning province, Harbin in 
Heilongjiang province, and Tianjin( Table 4.3 ). 
The reasons for the density of Korean companies in the above areas were as 
follows. 
1) Close geographical location 
The central government allowed the Shandong province to grant Korean 
companies special treatment in order to attract them, as Shandong, just across the 
Yellow sea, is the closest province to Korea. Trade between the two sides was 
accelerated with the establishment of the Incheun-Weihai ferry service in Sep. 
16 Pyung Seup-Yang, Jong Sek-An. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment Policy and 
Korean Direct Investment in China. CAS, Dec. 1992, pp 29-32. 
17 “The honeymoon is over." Business China, January 25, 1993, pp 4-5. 
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1990. The provincial government was so eager to attract Korean investors that it 
sent official staff to Korea to host investment talks. 
2) High cost and tough competitiveness in southern coastal areas 
Korean direct investment in China started booming in about 1989. The southern 
coastal provinces, which were already successfully implementing the reform 
program, were already well-developed by investors from Hong Kong, Japan, 
Taiwan, and western countries. There were no advantages for Korean companies ( 
mostly small and medium size ) to take. Higher operational costs (labor and land ) 
and the competitive edge built up by already existing companies discouraged those 
Korea companies with a small amount of capital from investing in those areas, 
whereas Korean companies could benefit from the SEZs in the north and eastern 
coastal areas including Shandong because such areas beefed up their development 
from about 1988. 
3) Cultural common thread 
There is a huge population of Korean-Chinese in the 3 north-eastern provinces, 
Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang( about 2 million ). Most of them are descendants 
of Koreans who were sent by Japan as soldiers during World War II. They have 
many common threads with Koreans in terms of language, and culture. Therefore 
Korea companies preferred to establish their businesses in these areas. 
4) Others 
Companies who hoped to enter China selected areas in which many companies in 
similar industries were located in an attempt to minimize overhead costs and to 
protect themselves( many companies believed that by clustering investment in 
particular areas they would be protected from some of the problems in China ). 
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Figure 4.2 Figure 4.3 
Korean Direct Investment by Region Korean Direct Investment by Region 
(Unt i l Jun. 1992，Contract base) (Unt i l Jun. 1992，Amount base) 
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Table 4.3 
Korean Direct Investment until Jun. 1992 by Region 
(US$ in thousand ) 
Region No. of contracts Amt. of contracts 
The gulf of Pohai HO $129,159 
Shandong province 91 74,621 
Beijing 23 31,299 
Tianjin 22 20,194 
Heibei 4 3,045 
Northeastern 3 provinces 106 $68,101 
Liaoning 60 31,964 
Jilin 23 6,888 
Heilongjiang ^ 29,249 
Southeast China 21 $30,515 
Guangdong 15 20,230 
Fujian 4 9485 
Hainan 2 8 ^ 
East Coastal provinces 15 $22,247 
Shanghai 2 6,500 
Zhejiang 3 5,187 
Jiangsu 10 10,560 
Source : The Bank ofKorea and KOTRA 
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Figure 4.4 
Distribution ofInvestors in Selected Areas in 1991 圓圍 
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As shown in Figure 4.4, in 1991, Korea was a major investor in both Shandong and 
Liaoning province, however Korean investment in Guangdong province was 
insignificant. 
Distribution of investment 
As shown in Table 4.4, about 91.1% of total investment by Korean companies 
in China before Jun.l992 was in the manufacturing industry. Other than automobile 
components and basic electronic components( 8.2% of the total number of projects 
and 11.2% of the total value )，which are both labor-intensive and capital-intensive, 
those labor-intensive industries such as textile and leather companies had occupied a 
large portion of the total investment. 
The situation of investment in non-manufacturing industries was worse( only 
8.9% of the total number of projects, and 14.2% of the total value ). There was less 
room left for Korean companies to invest. For example, the construction, and hotel 
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industries had already become highly competitive and saturated to the point where 
further investment was not welcome by the Chinese authorities. 
The average value of manufacturing industry projects was US$ 0.8 million whereas 
the size of non-manufacturing investment was negligible. 
Table 4.4 
Distribution of Investment by Industry until Jun. 1992 
(US$ in thousand ) 
Industry No. of projects % of total Amt. of projects % of total 
Manufacturing ^ 91.1% $214,433 85.8% 
Food 17 6.0 9,458 3.8 
Textile 72 25.5 41,159 16.5 
Footwear and Leather 32 11.3 38,425 15.4 
Lumber and Furniture 12 4.3 2,380 1.0 
PulpandPrinting 4 1.4 2,636 1.1 
Petrochemical 6 2.1 10,156 4.1 
Nonmetallic mineral 6 2.1 3,163 1.3 
Metallic product 14 5.0 14,400 5.8 
Electronic components 23 8.2 27,920 11.2 
Machinery 10 3.5 11,071 4.4 
Others ^ ^ 53,665 21.5 
Non-manufacturing 25 8.9% $35,589 14.2% 
Agriculture 1 0.4 1,900 0.8 
Mining 4 1.4 1,302 0.5 
Fishery 11 3.9 9,340 4.5 
Restaurant 7 2.5 22,447 9.0 
Transportation & warehouse 1 0.4 500 0.2 
Trading 1 OA j^2_ 0.0 
Total 282 — 100.0 $250,022 100.0 
Source : The Bank ofKorea and KOTRA. 
Korean Direct Investment after Mid-1992 
Although high local interest rates and the depressed stock market in Korea in 
1993 caused an overall tightening of capital, Korean investment in China had increased 
thanks to high confidence gained from the diplomatic normalization. However, 
saturation in the labor-intensive industries in China and the high density of Korean 
companies with small projects in a few coastal provinces called for structural 
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adjustment and regional diversification/^ The existing patterns of Korean investment 
started to be transformed by the entry of a large number of Korean conglomerates in 
about late 1993. 
Objective of China projects 
An increasing number of Korean companies are putting effort into developing 
the huge consumer market by themselves, or using trade agencies and public 
institutions. There is strong demand from more than 1.2 billion consumers for high 
quality but cheap products as China's population is increasingly urbanizing.^^ China's 
consumer market is estimated to have great potential and expected to grow fast. In 
addition, China has been gradually lifting the restrictions against foreign firms in the 
domestic consumer market. Some Korean companies are trying to build up strong 
brand images and to occupy prime locations. 
Samsung Co., Korea's largest conglomerate, held trade fairs, promotional 
campaigns, and sponsored sports events in an attempt to build their image in the 
market. In addition, the company further strengthened its marketing by opening two 
offices in Tsingdao, and in Chongqing respectively in June and September 1993.^ ^ 
Type of investment 
More Korean companies are forming equity or cooperative joint ventures with 
Chinese partners in order to penetrate the Chinese market. The Chinese partners of the 
foreign-invested enterprises can play an important role to promote the sale of joint 
venture products in the domestic market. For instance, since 1992, Samsung has 
18 Samuel S Kim, "Killing four birds." China Economic Review. Dec.,1994, pp 11-14. 
19 China Consumer Market, Hong Kong Trade Development Council. Aug.,1994, pp 
2-3. 
20 Business Korea, Jul 1993, p 62. 
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injected US$100 million into joint ventures to produce a range of consumer durable 
goods.2i 
Size of investment 
Time-consuming and complicated steps taken by the Korean government 
before approval of overseas investment( especially for communist and countries with 
no diplomatic ties ) as well as uncertainty in China made it difficult for large 
conglomerates to invest in China until late 1992. 
However, as this approval process has eased along with diplomatic ties, the 
number of projects involving large companies has sharply increased, and the value of 
projects has become higher despite a dip in 1994. The Korean conglomerates have 
played a key role in transforming existing investment patterns. In the first half of 1995, 
compared to the same period of 1994, the number of projects decreased by 16.8%, 
however, the value of projects increased by 65.6%. This accounts for the increasing 
number oflarge-scale projects by Korean companies. 
Location 
As in the previous years, the gulf of Pohai and the three northeast provinces 
have been the favorite destinations for Korean companies. Korean investment in the 
two regions was 86.1% of the total number and 84.4% of the total value, in 1993, and 
71.9% and 83.8% respectively in 1994( Table 4.5 ). In respect to the average value per 
project, these provinces recorded high numbers. Shandong province recorded the 
highest ( US$ 1.6 million ), followed by Tianjin( 1.3 million ), and Heilongjiang 
province( 1.1 mill ion) in 1993. 
21 rmsshorder Monitor, May31, 1995, p 9. 
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The southeastern regions such as Guangdong province are not still very 
attractive to Korean investors except for the large conglomerates targeting the 
relatively sophisticated customers and well-developed market, whereas Korean 
investment in Shanghai has increased in line with the fast development of the area since 
1992. 
Table4.5 
Korean Direct Investment in China, from 1993 to 1994, by region 
(US$ in million ) 
Regions i ^ 1 ^ 
Amount No. of contracts Amount No. of contracts 
The gulfofPohai $384.6(61.8%)|~~290(46.1%)~~ $397.3(48.5%) ~~~463(43.4%)~ 
Shandong province 245.6 155 206.6 245 
Beijing 24.6 48 62.5 76 
Tianjin 94.6 72 112.3 108 
Heibei province 1 ^ lJ^  | ^ ^ 
Northeast provinces $151.4(24.3%) 241(38.3%) $191.6(23.4%) 431(40.4%)~ 
Liaoning 59.7 123 118.6 232 
Jilin 35.6 69 50.6 141 
Heilongjiang ^ 49 ^ 58 
Southeast and Shanghai $32.2(5.2%) 36(5.7%) $81.5(9.9%) 59(5.5%) 
Guangdong province 21.0 23 34.0 25 
Shanghai H ^ U ^ ^ 
Others $54.1(8.7»/^ 62(9.9%) ~^48.9(18.2%)_ 11(10.4%) 
Total $622.3 629 $819.7 1066 
Source : The Bank ofKorea 
Note : (f igure) indicates the figure for each region as a percentage of the total. 
In addition, one of the increasing patterns of Korean investment is to move 
production facilities to inland areas and to speed up marketing in less developed areas, 
as overall costs in the coastal areas became too high for Korean companies already in 
these areas and new entrants to invest in such areas. In addition, to cope with the 
disparity between provinces, the central government began granting more favorable 
treatment to investors in the inland provinces. It is also one of the major objectives of 
China's Eighth Five-Year plan(1991〜1995) to create the conditions for balanced 
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growth among the different regions and industries. The current most popular provinces 
for Korean companies are Hunan, Hubei, Anhui, and Sichuan provinces( Table 4.6 ). 
Table 4.6 
Examples ofInvestment to Inner Provinces by Korean Companies 
Region Company Nature of Type of Amt. Comments 
business investment 
Anhui Hyun Dai electronics Electronic Joint venture 2,000 Under construction 
components 
Hubei HyunDai Automobile Joint venture 6,900 Under construction 
automobile components 
Hunan LG electronics Color TV Joint venture 27,247 Under construction 
Sichuan Kum Ho construction Transportation Joint venture In operation 
Dae Woo Transportation Joint venture 1,000 In operation 
Ko Hap Synthetic fibers 5,300 Under consideration 
LG electronics House appliance Joint venture Under consideration 
Sources : The Bank ofKorea and KOTRA 
Distribution of investment 
As shown in Table 4.7, investment in the manufacturing industry is still 
dominant, 91.1% in 1993 and 81.1% in 1994, but those non-manufacturing industries 
such as trading, fisheries, retail have increased. The textile and garment industry 
recorded the largest number of projects in both 1993 and 1994, however the average 
amount of Korean direct investment per project in the industry was only about US$ 
590,000, and US$ 490,000 respectively. This indicates that a small projects are still 
dominant in light and labor-intensive industries. 
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Table 4.7 
Distribution ofInvestment by Industry 
( No. of contracts, Amt. of contracts, % of total, and US$ in mill ion) 
Industry 1 ^ 1994 
No. % Amt. % No. % Amt. % 
Manufacturing 573~~ 91.1 583.2 ~ ~ ^ 8 ^ ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ 695.5 ~ ~ ^ ~ ~ 
Petrochemical 54 8.6 53.8 8.6 96 9.0 70.5 8.6 
Metallic product 72 11.5 125.3 20.1 101 9.5 160.9 19.6 
Textile and Garment 130 20.7 76.0 12.2 191 18.0 93.5 11.4 
Food 45 7.2 17.0 2.7 71 6.7 43.5 5.3 
Footwear and Leather 56 9.0 62.5 10.0 90 8.4 60.8 7.4 
Others 216 34.1 248.6 40.1 315 39.5 266.3 32.5 
Non-manufacturing 56 8.9 39.2 6.2 200 ~ l8?7 123.8 I s l ~ 
Trading 5 0.8 2.1 0.3 28 2.6 9.2 1.1 
Fishery 7 1.1 2.1 0.3 13 1.2 22.0 2.7 
Others 44 7.0 35.0 5.6 159 14.9 92.6 11.3 
li^tal 629 100 622.3 100 1066 100 819.7 一 100 
Source : The Bank ofKorea. 
Korean companies introduced a relatively lower level of technology compared 
to US and Japan. Over the past two years, Korean investment, however, has provided 
China with technical support and consisted of an number of capital-intensive, and 
technology-intensive projects. Korean investment in the petrochemical sector has 
surged due to the shortage of petrochemical products in China. Korean investment in 
the energy, metallic product, electronics, telecommunication and automobile industries 
has also increased sharply. For example, Korean Electronic Power Corporation 
participated in the maintenance and development of nuclear power plants in 
Guangdong in 1994. Hyundai, Kia, and Daewoo are competing against each other for 
larger market share in the automobile industry, and Samsung and L G have been 
involved the telecommunication industry?〕 
Korea has become one of the technology exporters to China. As shown in Table 
4.8, there was a big difference between Korea and other major countries in terms of 
22 Samuel S Kim, "Killing four birds. “ China Economic Review. Dec.,1994，pp 11-14. 
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number of contracts. However, the average amount per project was US$ 38 million, 
much higher than that ofJapan( US$ 17 million ), USA( US$ 17.3 million ) and other 
major technology exporters. This is because only a few large conglomerates have 
played the dominant role in exporting technology. As China is requesting more Korean 
investment in areas such as transportation, telecommunications, energy, 
petrochemicals, and electronics, Korean investment is likely to be further diversified 
into capital and technology-intensive industries( Table 4.9 ). 
Table 4.8 
The Top Six Technology Exporters and Korea to China in 1993 
(US$ inmillion)"""^^ No .o f %of to ta l Value of % oftotal 
contracts contracts contracts value 
l j S A 104 — 21.10 — 507 8.30 
-Japan 101 “ 20.49 1746 — 28.59 — 
Germany 83 16.84 — 748 — 12.24 
Italy 53 10.75 _ 922 — 15.09 
France 17 3.45 — 175 — 2.86 
"Canada 14 2.84 188 — 3.08 ~ 
[Korea 8 1.62 304 4.98 




China's Major Technology Import Industries 
Field N a % oftotal Value of % oftotal 
(US$ in million) pf contracts contracts contracts value 
"Petrochemical ~ 110 一 22.31 2600 42.55 
—Energy — 32 一 6.49 1138 18.63 
Metallurgy, Non-ferrous metals ^] 12.37 ^ 13.63 
Machinery and electronic 111 22.52 480 7.86 
equipment 
Telecommunication 42 8 ^ ^ 6.99 
l rexti le 57 “ 11.56 一 328 5.37 
Others — 80 一 16.23 304 4.98 
|Total 493 100 6110 100 
Source : China's 1993 Yearbook. 
Problems that Korean Companies Face 
The general problems for Korean companies regarding China investment can be 
split into two periods, before and after they launch their business in China. Korean 
companies are facing most of the problems, which are common to all foreign investors 
in China, while some problems are unique to Korean investors as presented below. 
Changes in China's business environment have caused Korean companies, from time to 
time, to reorder their major concerns. 
Before Launching Business 
Lack of supportive information 
Most Korean companies who hoped to get involved in business in China had 
difficulties accessing resources and information on China's business system, and 
environment. Many surveys revealed that many Korean companies had failed in China 
simply because of a lack of or poor information.^^ 
23 Evaluation of the Operations ofKorean Companies In China. Korean Trade 
Association, Mar. 1995, pp 5-6, 46. 
(中國投資早 ^ ]企業到經營實態碎成果 .韓國貿易協會 ,M a r . l 9 9 5 . ) 
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Selection of local partner 
Probably, the most important decision for a foreign company doing business in 
China is to find the right local partner. This is because the role of the local partner in 
handling problems and legal affairs is very important, Also, political and commercial 
contacts of the local partner are crucial in securing markets and supplies, as economic 
activities in China are not solely dependent on market mechanism. 
Other than the above, very often a lack of authority and funding ability of a 
potential partner cause another problem?* Fully authorized local partners are able to 
keep the business under control. Especially, when the contract values involved are 
significantly high, and the austerity program is implemented , the ability and political 
influence of the Chinese partner to access the necessary funding is vital, otherwise, the 
foreign partner may have to fund the whole project. Many Chinese enterprises rely on 
bank lending to fund their share of agreements, although there are non-bank financial 
institutions and stock markets. 
One source published a report on popular channels used by Korean companies 
to search for and choose Chinese partners. For both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing companies, the most common channel was through direct contacts or 
requests from Chinese parties. These parties research possible partners through 
available sources like periodicals, and lists of firms, then contact them directly. The 
other main source is through introduction, so-called “guan x f \ by personal connection. 
Other sources are the institutions such as the Korea Trade Association, the 
24 China 1994, Business Monitor International Ltd. 1994, pp 128-130. 
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Commercial and Industrial department( A Korean government department ), and the 
Korean embassy in China.^ ^ 
Bureaucratic approval procedures in both Korea and China 
Some companies complain oflong and complicated approval procedures set for 
overseas investments by both the Chinese and the Korean authorities( Appendix I I I 
details the steps for approval for foreign-funded enterprises in China ). First, a 
company goes through the tedious procedures in Korea, then in turn, the company 
finds itself struggling with much worse conditions in order to obtain approval from 
Chinese side. From time to time, in China, approvals have been processed not by 
regulations but by human factors like personal relationships, corruption etc.. This very 
often makes investors confijsed and discouraged. 
During Operations 
Legal svstem 
It was in July 1994 that China introduced corporate law, governing the 
establishment and operation of large and small companies throughout China's socialist 
market economy. Although, to some extent, the legal foundation contributes to a 
stable business environment, there is still ambiguity. The rules and regulations have 
been changed continuously, and are rarely applied uniformly by the different provinces 
and cities in order to attract investors by providing better incentives such as the 
privileges, tax breaks, etc., which causes instability and conftision. This unstable legal 
environment was one of the frustrating factors for Korean companies( especially for 
wholly owned companies who had to solve problems themselves ). 
25 Evaluation of the Operations ofKorean Companies In China. Korean Trade 
Association, Mar. 1995, pp 47-48. 
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In addition, there is not much chance for foreign firms to protect themselves 
from unfair business transactions. Fortunately, reforms to the official arbitration system 
have made successfiil progress. Under the new code announced by International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration, foreign companies in China can be treated more 
fairly concerning legal afFairs.^ ^ However the current environment with regard to law is 
still not satisfying foreign investors in China. Thus it seems that negotiation is the best 
way to solve problems related to law. 
Foreign exchange 
The inconvertibility of the RMB presents a serious problems for foreign firms 
in China in repatriating profits generated from the domestic market and in managing 
cash flows. Swap centers emerged in all major cities and, were later, replaced by the 
National Foreign Exchange in Shanghai, acting as a national interbank market in Apr. 
1994. On 1 Jan. 1994, the dual exchange-rate system was abolished. However, such 
methods implemented to help the problems related to foreign exchange have not solved 
all problems and they are still suffering from the shortage of hard currency and the 
transitional problems like delays in transaction.^^ 
The figure 4.5 shows the common types of foreign exchange balancing 
methods used by foreign investors. In spite of the shortage of hard currency( i.e. lower 
liquidity ) in the swap centers, they have been the most popular method for foreign-
funded companies to meet their foreign exchange balance. 
26 China 1994, Business Monitor International, p 132. 
24 China 1994, Business Monitor International Ltd. 1994, pp 128-130. 
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Figure 4.5 
Foreign Exchange Balance Methods taken by Foreign Companies 
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Source : Lucille a Barale and Thomas E. Jones, "Getting Strict with Foreign 
Exchange." The China Business Review, Sep.-Oct. 1994, pp 52-56. 
Note ; The figure was created by The China Business Review based on the result of the 
survey on 41 Foreign-funded companies including 38 joint ventures and 3 wholly-owned foreign 
enterprises. 
Over the past three years, Korean investment in China led mostly by the large 
conglomerates has increasingly focused on selling their products in China's domestic 
market. Many Korean companies involved in domestic sales have been facing more 
difficulties in balancing their foreign exchange than export-oriented companies. 
Taxes ^^  
The recent tax reforms implemented in 1994 were aimed at reducing the 
country's over-dependence on the loss-making state-sector as a source of direct tax 
revenue to other sectors by merging the existed enterprise income taxes on state-
owned, collectively-owned, privately-owned, and foreign-owned enterprises into a 
28 "Taxing Matters." Business China, 27 Dec.,1993, pp 1-3. 
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uniform enterprise income tax of33%( widening the narrow income tax base ). Before 
the new tax system, in spite of faster growth of income, the government's tax income 
revenue did not grow in line with the increased wealth because a large proportion of 
income tax revenue came from the state-owned sector( 33% corporate income tax ), 
where many state-owned enterprises operated at a loss and it was difficult to collect 
income tax from the non-state sector( although it paid higher tax, 55% ), it had a 
incentive, for example a tax holiday and tax reduction for foreign-funded companies, to 
avoid tax. In 1992, only 20% of the country's income tax revenue was collected from 
the non-state sector. This new tax system, especially value added tax( VAT ), has been 
a burden for foreign companies in China. The degree of impact of VAT on foreign 
companies depends on the nature of their products( 17% VAT on most goods with a 
few exceptions ). The new system is, however, flexible. Exporters are reimbursed for 
VAT paid on both domestic and imported materials, but are not required to collect the 
tax on export sales. In service sector industries excluding commodity wholesale and 
retail sales, a business tax ranging from 3 to 20% is subject, instead o fVAT . 
Corruption 
Corruption stems from problems in the reform process such as the combination 
of rapid growth and increased shortage, and deeply rooted bureaucracy. It also stems 
from discretion given to individuals and organizations by a socialist system where most 
things are not allowed unless someone gives p e r m i s s i o n ? ; The corruption problem can 
put a company operating within the law at a serious disadvantage because its corrupt 
competitor can take an unfair advantage. 
24 China 1994, Business Monitor International Ltd. 1994, pp 128-130. 
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From time to time, the central authorities have shown strong willingness to 
root out corruption. However, there's certainly a limitation on how far they are 
prepared to go. In addition, it's necessary for companies to understand the law and to 
distinguish between good relationships and corruption( although it's very difficult in 
China). This certainly helps the company not to get involved in any corrupt business. 
High export requirements 
Chinese government has provided a mixture of tax incentives for export-
oriented companies. Companies exporting more than 70% of their products to 
overseas markets are exempted from taxes. However, this policy has certainly 
discouraged companies whose main reason to invest in China is to penetrate local 
market. This problem is not serious as in the past. The requirement can be lowered by 
negotiation with the local government. 
Infrastructure 
The lack of infrastructural development in China, especially in the energy, 
transportation and telecommunication sectors, has made operations difficult and 
caused delays. Congestion, and chronic bottlenecks are much more serious problems in 
the large and developed cities. Insufficient land transportation is one of the key 
reasons for many Korean companies to locate their businesses near the big ports. The 
infrastructure problem is more serious in the inland provinces. 
Labor management and wages 
Foreign investors are given greater autonomy in labor management. They may 
create their own human resource management system, so that workers may be hired 
and fired without authority's interference in those special cases manifested by law. 
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The increased labor costs, high turnover rate of talented stafF( more serious in 
partly or wholly foreign-owned companies and coastal open areas ), and a lower moral 
are becoming more serious problems. Figure 4.6 shows that increase in wages was 
higher than the inflation level. Many Korean companies are providing non-taxable 
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Access to domestic markets 
Chinese partners are still not familiar with the concept of marketing. They are 
likely to depend on existing sales channels and method used under the planned 
economy( except those in big cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Guanzhou, etc. ). Lower 
revenue generated from Chinese domestic sales( in part, due to government restriction 
against foreign funded companies on the domestic market ) was an attribute to the 
large export rate of small and medium Korean-funded companies. 
Some Korean companies have been trying to penetrate the market, where the 
local partners' marketing did not satisfy them, by either using their own trade 
subsidiaries( popular method by the large conglomerates ), or hiring local trading 
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companies, or increasing advertising through available media. However, other than for 
well- known brands, a large number of firms found it hard to build up a distribution 
network. 
Finance facilities 
Korean companies have relied on financial support from their headquarters. 
China's macroeconomic policy has generally failed to control its economic 
performances, for example, the decrease in inflation was achieved at the cost of 
slowing the growth rate of GNP in 1993. 
There are not many sources of fund raising in China. Bank lending plays a key 
role in supplying necessary ftinds. However, since the banking system in China is not 
well developed, lending has taken place on political rather than commercial 
consideration, and tight credit control is, from time to time, a favorite means of 
stabilizing economy by the government, foreign-funded enterprises have found it hard 
to secure necessary capital internally.^^ 
According to a survey, Korean companies raised fund necessary to invest 
overseas through reserved capital inside the companies, the financial institutions in 
Korea, and lending from the banks in China or Hong Kong.^^ It also revealed that 
strict lending policy of the Korean banks for overseas investment, strict foreign 
exchange regulations in Korea, and the lack of international experience of Korean 
companies in ftinding are obstacles to deal with financial matters. 
30 China 1994, Business Monitor International, pp 73-75. 
31 Evaluation of the Operations ofKorean Companies In China. Korean Trade 
Association, Mar. 1995, pp 55-56. 
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Supply of raw material or components 
A low volume of domestically available high-quality materials, the poor 
distribution and transportation system have caused difficulties in securing necessary 
materials. 
Rising account receivable 
As companies find themselves difficult to collect payments from their 
customers because of less developed banking networks, and the tight credit control 
policy, many Korean-funded companies have refiised to extend credit to customers and 
insisted on cash-on-delivery. 
High living costs and language barrier 
High living costs for foreigners make China one of the most expensive 
countries. In addition, failure of close communication has been found in many cases as 
a major barrier to efficient operations. 
Others 
Other than above problems, bureaucratic interference by provincial governments, 
rising operational costs due to high inflation, and quality control have been the 
recurrent Korean investors' concerns. 
Case Study 
A Korean textile company operating its joint venture with Chinese in Jilin 
province is chosen to study Korean direct investment more in-depth. The name of the 
company is not disclosed because the CEO of the company requested. In this section, 
at first, a summary of the company's experience based on research and an interview 
with the CEO of the company is presented and then findings from this case study 
follow. 
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Summary of the Case 
Company background 
X company is listed in the Korea stock exchange, and is one of the Korea's 
largest manufacturers of woolen fabrics, yarns and blended fabrics. To diversify its 
business, it entered into the men's suits industry. Its profitability rose sharply thanks to 
the sound cost management, the recovery in exports to the US market, and increased 
garment sales boost in the 1994 fiscal year. It established its production line of ready-
to-wear apparel in Jilin province in China by setting up a 50-50 equity joint venture. It 
plans to put more emphasis on export to increase the export proportion to 50% of 
total sales. 
Motivation toward China 
In the early 1990s, a letter addressed to X company came in from a large state-
owned textile company in Jilin province in China. The letter expressed Chinese 
company's wish to set up ajoint cooperation with X company. At that time, China was 
emerging as a production option for X company to cope with sharply increasing 
domestic wages. X company decided to set up a joint venture after lengthy 
consideration since it was the first involvement for the company in overseas 
production. The business environment and political mood of the early 1990s between 
the two countries were also favorable to joint ventures. X company formally 
established ajoint venture with the Chinese partner in Sep.l993. 
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Agreement 
The provincial government was so supportive that it allowed a set of 
negotiations to go smoothly, the processing time for approval to be shorter. Some 
interesting points of the contract are as follows. 
1) X company provides machines, supporting equipment, and technical staff for 
training and quality control. In turn, the local partner provides facilities, and raw 
materials( fabrics). 
2) The Chinese partner pays for the right to use the X company's two brands. 
3) Great autonomy in human resource management is given to X company. 
4) A certain proportion of finished garment is subject to export, and the Chinese party 
holds the responsibility for marketing the products in the domestic market. 
It's worth noting that neither party injected a huge amount of capital in the 
contract. Only a small amount of capital was required in setting-up operation. 
Details of contractual progress 
The local authority has also been helpful during operations. It provided a few 
incentives such as a lower export requirement, and financial arrangement.( the 
company claimed it was the first large Korean company involved in that industry in the 
city )• 
While producing garments under the two brand names, X company found the 
production costs far lower than those in Korea, however, the quality of fabric 
provided by the Chinese was far below the standard required by the sophisticated 
overseas markets. X company decided to supply thejoint venture with Korean fabric in 
order to satisfy the overseas market( thejoint venture, however, uses fabrics provided 
by the Chinese partner to serve the Chinese domestic market). 
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The sales turnover in the Chinese market has been far below forecast. This is 
because the Chinese partner's marketing performance in the domestic market has been 
poor. The Chinese partner has relied on the existing distribution channels and failed to 
build a brand image( lack of marketing expertise ). 
The company used the inherent local workforce of the Chinese company, 
although it had an alternative of recruiting Chinese-Koreans. This was not only 
because wages for Chinese-Korean were higher than those for local Chinese but 
because the company's strategy was geared toward early localization. The joint 
venture pays all 102 employees 20 or 30% more than the average according to their 
skill levels and positions as well as providing a comfortable working environment( X 
company renovated the factory before starting operations ). The employees have been 
more committed to their jobs and the company has managed to avoid serious labor 
disputes. 
However, the Chinese partner was impatient in its quest to acquire necessary 
skills. Some employees rushed into manufacturing stages without deep understanding. 
This sometimes increased the defect rate. 
In addition, from time to time, the factory remained idle due to an electricity 
supply shortage. This seriously affected the productivity of workers.( the CEO 
estimated the productivity of thejoint venture to be one-third of that ofa factory ofthe 
same kind in Korea ). Like most companies, the joint venture installed a power 
generator in order to cope with frequent black-outs. 
The company has suffered from long lead times and unexpected costs. 
According to staff, it takes, on average, more than a week including customs 
inspections, to ship finished products to Korea because land transportation( the 
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company uses container trucks ) is very difficult for the company to arrange due to a 
shortage of trucks and poor road conditions and there's heavy congestion at the port( 
the company ships their products through the Dalian port ). Even worse, from time to 
time, the products remain in warehouses longer than scheduled so additional costs are 
incurred. 
Findings from the Case Study 
It 's worth noting some of the points taken from this case study. They are as follows. 
1) Setting a clear objective is necessary 
Companies should set clear objectives. Objectives help the companies focus on 
themselves. For example, the company in the above case study has a clear 
objective, which is to focus on learning business in China from scratch. It started its 
initial operation in China with a small amount of capital. The company is about to 
start its second operation in Tsingdao based on the experience gained from the first 
operation. 
2) Selection of a local partner is very important 
As mentioned above, state-owned companies with the backing of provincial 
government are preferable as partners. Governmental support is necessary in 
smoothing the path of negotiations, and shortening the processing time for 
approval. It also helps to reduce operational problems such as labor disputes, and 
take care of financial shortfall of Chinese partners. To choose the best partner, 
comprehensive research should be conducted. X company had a lack of 
information on China. Better potential partners and locations more eager to attract 
foreign investors may have existed. 
3) A detailed agreement is required to reduce the possible problems 
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The more detailed the contract is, the less problems arise. X company spent a long 
time negotiating with the Chinese partner. Thanks to the detailed contract, to some 
extent, the company managed to avoid possible serious problems in China. 
However the additional costs were incurred to ship fabrics made in Korea because 
the quality of fabrics provided by the Chinese side did not meet the standard of X 
company. 
4) Difficulties certainly exist in working with a Chinese partner. 
To some extent, joint ventures causes managerial, and operational inefficiencies 
due to cultural differences, different management styles and views on business. 
5) Location of investment is important 
Location is an important factor, especially, in developing countries, because easily 
accessible locations are more likely to provide investors with better infrastructure, 
higher quality oflabor, and shorter delivery times. 
6) A little incentive works in certain areas in China 
As mentioned in the case study, a little motivation( not necessarily monetary )’ can 
result in a better-than-expected outcome in less developed areas in China. 
Although small incentives are not likely to play that much of an important role in 
the developed areas such as the southeastern areas, Shanghai, Beijing, etc., non-
taxable benefits such as expensive accommodation or trips abroad are incentives 
which help to motivate employees. 
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Evaluation of Korean Direct Investment in China 
In this section, Korean investment is evaluated by two methods. They are, 
firstly, evaluation of Korean investment by industry and region using a survey done by 
Korea Trade Association( KOTRA), and secondly identifying key successful factors in 
doing business in China based on the same source above. 
Evaluation of Korean Direct Investment by Industry and Region 
Despite the obstacles in doing business in China discussed above, a survey has 
revealed that Korean investors are generally satisfied with their China investments.^^ 
Table4.10 
Evaluation ofPerformance by Industry and Region 
Level of performance Industry Region 
High level of performance Petrochemical, and Metallic Shandong, Guangdong province, 
and Nonmetallic Shanghai, and Tsingdao 
Middle level of performance Textile and Garment, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Footwear, Machinery, and Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu 
Electronic device province, Beijing, and Tianjin 
Low level of performance Lumber and Furniture, Pulp Other areas 
and Printing, and Food 
Source: Evaluation of the Operations ofKorean Companies In China, Korean Trade 
Association, Mar. 1995, p 90. 
Note: The above table was produced by integrating the answers of 173 companies surveyed. Three 
factors were considered, namely achievement of objectives, profitability, and potential growth of their 
Korean-funded enterprises. 
Evaluation, bv industry 
In particular, companies in the petrochemical, and metal and nonmetallic 
industries showed better than expected results. China is the world's fifth largest oil 
producer and its potential oil reserves are huge. China has acquired the technology 
32 Evaluation of the Operations ofKorean Companies In China, Korean Trade 
Association, Mar. 1995，pp 87-88. 
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necessary to increase output from onshore wells and to develop and explore new 
offshore wells injoint ventures with overseas partners. In addition, the Chinese policy, 
pursuing continuous growth in the energy and infrastructure sector, helped Korean 
petrochemical companies, and metallic producers( steel and iron ) and nonmetallic 
mineral manufacturers to achieve high level of performance. Companies involved in 
the textile and footwear industries, however, achieved just average satisfaction due to 
surging variable costs and high competition in the Chinese market.( Table 4.10 ) 
Evaluation, bv region 
The companies located in the southeast, Shandong province, and Shanghai 
recorded the highest achievement. Although Guangdong province was the favored 
region in terms of business environment and profitability, many companies replied that 
high competitiveness among companies in the province affected the potential growth 
of Korean-fimded companies. In contrast, the three northeastern provinces were still 
not satisfying in terms of profitability, but it was believed that they would provide good 
opportunities because of their close proximity to North Korea and Russia. The two 
cities Tianjin and Beijing, however, did not provide best return. This is because high 
competition among the large number ofKorean companies. 
Key Factors for Success in Doing Business in China 
As shown in Figure 4.7, leadership from headquarters( variable 8 ) in Korea 
made the biggest contribution to successful performances, followed by having a good 
relationship with Chinese partners( variable 9 ). 
Some ofthe problems discussed above have made it difficult for Korean-funded 
enterprises to be independent bodies from their Korean headquarters. Therefore, other 
than a few globalized conglomerates, a large number of Korean companies operating 
61 
their ventures in China has heavily relied on support from their parent companies in 
Korea. This is somewhat related to the high correlation between performance and size 
of parent companies. Generally, large companies can provide frequent and substantial 
support for their ventures( variable 1 ). 
Figure 4.7 
Important Factors to Achieve High Performance by Correlation 
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Source : Evaluation of the Operations of Korean Companies In China, Korean 
Trade Association, Mar. 1995, p 92. 
Note: The variables are size of parent companies(l), size of investment(2), share holding(3), 
dependency on overseas resources(4), kind of products(5), localization(6), proportion of 
exports(7), leadership from Korean headquarters(8), and relationship with local partner(9), in 
ascending order. 
Having a good relationship with a Chinese partner is a very important factor in 
doing business in China. Chinese partners have been playing an important role in 
helping solve some of the problems. Another implication is the nature of projects. 
Generally, Korean companies did not provide the high technology required in both 
production management know-how for the Chinese, therefore Korean companies soon 
found themselves loosing bargaining power in both negotiation and joint-operations. In 
some areas like electronics, basic televisions, fridges, home appliances, garments, 
textiles, etc., China is now able to compete with other nations. As a result, companies 
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outside the high technology sector are likely to rely on good relationships for their 
success. 
Another important factor for success is high export ratio( variable 7 ), which 
means the more a venture exports its products, the higher profit it makes. It indicates 
that the market performances of Korean ventures in the Chinese market have not 
reached the point where the ventures can replace their export with sales in the Chinese 
market. 
It turned out that ventures securing their materials overseas( either from their 
headquarters in Korea or from third countries ) were more profitable than those 
depending on resources in China( variable 4 ). This was because of problems resulting 
from poor quality, and late delivery of materials. 
Other factors for success were early localization of the ventures( variable 6 ), and the 
large scale of the projects. Generally, large size projects can take advantage of the 
incentives from both the central and provincial governments( variable 2 ). In addition, 
ventures that concentrated on the manufacture of products that they were familiar with 
in Korea were more successful than those who attempted to branch out into new 
areas( variable 5 ), 
Opportunities and Threats 
There are both opportunities and threats for Korean companies in doing 
business in China as shown in Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8 
Opportunities and Threats 
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Threats 
There are both political and economic threats in China. 
Political uncertainty 
Although China has achieved high economic growth by the economic reforms, 
the political structure remains, to some extent, volatile. Over the past years, Jiang 
Zemin has enhanced his political power and credibility by leading the anti-corruption 
campaign. There have been power struggles between conservative and liberal factions 
in China, however these have been kept under controlled by Deng. There is certainly a 
high level of political uncertainty with regard to Chinese policy after Deng Xiaoping's 
death, in addition, the recent high tension between China and Taiwan, stemming from 
Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui's visit to USA, is also a factor that destabilizes the 
economic environment in China. 
Tight economic policy 
The tight economic policy has dampened sentiment towards investing China. 
The tight monetary policy of the Chinese government over the last two years has 
proven somewhat successful in creating a sound macroeconomic environment( CPI 
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slowed to 18.1% in Jun. 1995 from 24.1% in 1994 and the sustainable growth rate has 
been maintained, 11.8% in 1994 and 10% in 1995 ). The tight economic policy is likely 
to be continued for the coming years to maintain a sustainable growth rate by slowing 
investment except in those sectors where are required such as infrastructure, and high 
technology industries. 
Opportunities 
Moves towards more open market economy 
China has gained confidence in developing its country with the market 
economy. However, some sectors, especially many in the state-owned sectors, have 
not been controlled by supply and demand. The Chinese government is opening more 
state-sectors to private domestic and foreign investors to develop those sectors. This 
will certainly provide more chances for Korean investors to participate in. 
High consumption rate 
As labor productivity and per capita income have risen quickly through the 
reform process, Chinese people have become aware of opportunities to improve their 
standard ofliving. More and more households are moving into the middle class. In line 
with the reforms, the open policy has provided a wide range of new consumer goods. 
This encouraged Chinese people to consume more and their taste has become more 
sophisticated( Table 4.11 ). In addition the high savings rate recorded by an increasing 
number ofindependent young households may boost consumption in China. 
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Table4.11 
Private and Public Consumption, from 1989 to 1994 
(RMB in billion at 1990 Prices) 
1989 “ 1990 ~ 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Private 878.9 897.4 985.3 1147.9 1236.3 1410.6~~ 
Real % change 5.8 ^ ^ ] 6 ^ 77 14.1 
Public ~~140.6 I s ^ 178.0 207.3 234.7 2 6 8 . 7 ~ 
Real % change 13.3 13.5 11.5 16.5 13.2 14.5 
Source : World Bank Report, and the China Statistical Bureau. 
Box 1 : Highlighting Chinese Consumer Market 
The Chinese market can be broken down into several segments 
according to the level of development and demand of each province. The 
figure below presents some ideas about the demand, and purchasing power 
of the regional markets. 
Figure 4.9 
Positioning Several Market Segments based on Two Variables of 1991 
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Source : EKJ, Official Statistics. 
66 
Box 1( Cont'd) 
Table4.12 
Purchasing Power of Selected Inland Provinces 
Region Population in GDP in 1993 Consumer goods sales(RMB billion) 
1992(million) (RMB million) 1993 1992 % change 93/92 Ranking 
Sichuan — 110.0 186.60 — 71.8 63.0 + 14 4 
l lube i — 55.8 129.50 — 50.1 41.2 +22 9 
l ienan 88.6 — 158.03 “ 49.7 " l T J " +20 ~ ~ 1 0 
~ A ^ m 94.0 一 58.3 — 33.6 ~287~ +18 — 1 5 
Guangxi 43.8 — 77.30 ~ 30.0 ~24.4 +23 — 17 
i r ^ n x i 68.60 39.1 24.4 19.8 — +23 “ 20 
Source : Chinese Statistical Yearbook, and Statistical Survey of China 1994. 
As shown in the figures above, while residents in the coastal 
provinces possess a higher power, there is potential purchasing power in 
those inland provinces such as Sichuan, where there is the largest 
population, Guangxi, Jiangxi, Anhui, Hubei and Henan, where economy 
has grown fast. In addition, there is certainly higher purchasing power in 
urban areas than in rural areas. 
Investment in inland 
In 1992, foreign investment in those inner provinces such as inner Mongolia, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang was just 
over US$ 2 billion, which was only 4% of the total foreign investment in 1992.^ ^ As 
the central government has introduced measures to develop the economy of in the 
inland provinces，investment to those provinces has seen an increase( Figure 4.10 ). 
However, there are still both opportunities and risks for foreign investors considering 
the inland provinces( Box 2 : Pros & Cons ofinland investment) 




FDI in China by Region in 1994 
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Sources : Ministry ofForeign Trade and Economic Cooperation( MOFTEC ). 
Box 2: Pros & Cons of inland investment 
Pros 
1) Favorable government attitude toward the inner areas. 
The central authority has given some inland cities the rights( though it is 
a small number of inland cities ) to provide the same or nearly the same 
incentives as the busy coastal areas-SEZs, ETDZs or coastal cities. 
Aside from that, the central government established new specialized 
banks( SDB:State Development Bank, China Eximbank:Export-Import 
Bank of China,and ADB:Agriculture development Bank ) to facilitate 
financial aids and infrastructure development in less developed areas. 
This policy has enhanced border trade by reducing tariffs and linking 
transportation, and has opened inland infrastructure and oil and gas 
projects to foreign investors. 
2) More than 60% of the Chinese population are in the inland 
provinces^^ 
The main attractions for foreign investors are an ample supply of cheap 
labor, a lower labor turnover rate among semi-and less-skilled labor, and 
the huge potential market. 
Cons 
1) Presence of "pseudo “ economic zones. 
Although the state council in 1994 closed out 1000 of 2,700 special 
industrial zones set up by local governments, foreign companies should 
be careful not to get caught in an investment project in an "pseudo" 
economic zone. 
34 China's Consumer Market(1994 edition), Hong Kong Trade Development Council 
p3. ‘ 
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Box 2( Cont'd) 
2) A lack of infrastructure 
The different degree and pace of growth in infrastructure between inner 
areas and coastal areas make inland investment costly and difficult. A 
lack of deepwater ports, a poor road and railway network, and 
insufficient water and energy supply are the common problems in the 
inland provinces. 
3) Difficulties of access to skilled labor and managerial staff 
It costs foreign companies in the inland areas much more to hire 
qualified manager and expatriates due to an additional payment like a 




In this chapter, some recommendations are made based on the 
opportunities and threats in order to conclude this study. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Korean investment in China is in a 
transitional stage. Over the past three years, Korean investment in China has been led 
by large conglomerates, while small and medium-sized companies have been 
struggling. Korean investment is transforming from narrow-field and labor-intensive to 
more diverse, and capital and technology-intensive. While export-oriented companies 
still contributes a large proportion of the total investment, market development is 
becoming a priority to more Korean companies. 
As Korean companies become more aware of the environment in China, they 
have taken more lengthy and deep consideration to invest in China as the business 
environment has changed. It seems that a large number of Korean direct investment 
was either delayed, or canceled or scaled-back. As shown Figure 5.1, the realized 
Korean direct investment in China has fluctuated according to overall environmental 
changes in China. 
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Figure 5.1 
Realized Amount ofTotal Contracted Amount, 
from 1991 to 1994 
(Percentage) 
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Source : The figure is based on data from The Bank ofKorea 
China and Korea have had a relatively short period of full scale trade and 
investment, however, the two countries have become major economic partners. China 
and Korea can establish further bilateral business relations based on mutual trust. 
China's natural resources, huge potential market size, and fast growing economy may 
work together with Korea's strength in technology, processing and management 
expertise for a better future for the two countries. 
In the following section, some recommendations are presented for Korean 
investors. 
Recommendations 
Building Good Relationships is Helpful 
A company's relationships with local authorities and partners is very important 
in China. Relationships( guanxi ) with, especially, the top authorities in China may 
determine how fast, how far, and how easily a company can achieve its objectives. For 
instance, especially under the tight economic policy, which is currently used and 
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expected to continue, good relationships plays a crucial role in many aspects of 
business activities. In general, good relationships takes a long period and requires 
mutual trust, however corruption often plays an important role. For a long term 
success, well-established based on mutual trust and right use of guanxi are required for 
the better fiiture for a company. One to build good relationships is to increase contact 
by establishing representative offices in a company's target areas. 
Evaluate the Possible Types of Investment and Locations 
The number of investment vehicles is increasing in China. There are certainly 
advantages and disadvantages in the different types of investment vehicles( details are 
in Appendix I I ). For example, a foreign investor forming a joint venture may access 
China's market more easily using the local partner's existing distribution channels and 
receive incentives. On the other hand, there may be operational conflicts with the 
partner. A wholly foreign- owned enterprise( WFOE ) can maintain strong control 
over its operations although it may face many difficult problems that it can not solve 
alone. Korean companies should carefully consider and evaluate the alternatives 
according to their objectives in China, in order to be successful. I f the choice is either 
joint venture, joint stock company or limited liability company, partner selection is the 
most important step, especially when China is under tight economic policy or for those 
Korean companies hoping to share large set-up costs with local partners or relying on 
bank lending for necessary funding. 
There are also a large number of provinces, cities, and special zones where 
business can be located. The different locations provide different degrees of investment 
incentives and risks( different tax incentives in the different locations are detailed in 
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Appendix I ). In particular Korean companies may have to take risks i f they want to 
benefit from opportunities in investment in inland provinces. 
Technology Transfer is a Good Means for Getting a Higher Return 
The Chinese are eager to absorb foreign high technology. They provide 
incentives in various forms of tax reduction or flexibility( Chinese authorities employed 
a new technique, called “trade and technology" in technology transfer agreements, 
which means technology transfer at lower costs in return for an easy way to access the 
market35). Nowadays, life cycles in high technology industries are becoming much 
shorter. There is no longer reason for Korean investors to remain resistant in 
transferring technology that will probably be obsolete tomorrow as far as they can 
maintain control over how much and how quickly they transfer technology. Potential 
profit from aggressive market penetration can spur companies to develop new 
technology. 
It's Time to Get Actively Involved in the Chinese Market 
With the increasing consumption, China is willing to further open its retail 
sector to foreign investors with a large batch of licensing approvals for joint ventures 
and a set of relaxed regulations. To protect domestic retailers, the government has 
controlled retail licenses for foreign enterprises. Korean manufacturing companies can 
further penetrate the market through cooperation with Korean retailers rushing to 
China. In addition, the quality and quantity of information on the Chinese market is 
35 Christoper Engholm, Doing Business in Asia's Booming China Triangle. Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994, p 265. 
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improving with more sophisticated market research. These are certainly good signs and 
Korean companies can take advantage of them. 
In addition to the above reasons, the uncertainty over China's foreign relations 
in the future, especially with the USA, is another reason for Korean companies to put 
more efforts in penetrating the Chinese market. Although it's unlikely that the US 
government will refiise to renew China's MFN status, possible economic retaliation 
between the two countries in the future may have serious impacts on Korean 
companies in China because many of them are export-oriented and their major 
destination is the US market. 
Despite importance of Chinese market, it's not always easy to penetrate, not 
only because of regulations but also because of its huge and widely dispersed 
population. Korean companies should know where their markets are by doing 
comprehensive market research before entering China. 
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APPENDK I 
TAX EVCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN-EVVESTED ENTERPRISES m CHEVA 
1) Manufacturing enterprises 
Nationwide SEZs ETDZs Pudong New 
Development Area 
hicome Tax 30% — 15% 15%~ l_5% 
Tax FIE with terms of at Same as nationwide. Same as Same, but FIE with 15-
exemption least 10 years are bifrastructure and nation- year terms engaged in 
entitled with tax agricultural FIEs -wide energy 
exemption for the first with 15-year terms in or transportation 
2 profit-making years, Hainan receive construction qualify for 
followed by a 50% additional benefits tax exempt for 5 years 
reduction for the next and receive a 50% 
3 years reduction for the next 5 
years 
Open Coastal Cities High-Tech Zones FTZs Open Coastal 
economic areas 
Licome Tax 24%, but 15% if FIE 15%, but must be 15%, Same as open coastal 
is technologically approved as high- but rate area, but 15% is subject 
advanced, investing -tech enterprise is to FIE with intensive 
$ 30 million or subject technology 
investing in to 
transportation or locality 
harbor industries 
Tax Same as nationwide FIE with at least 10- Same as Same as nationwide 
exemption year terms qualify for nation-
tax exempt for first -wide 
profitable year and 
receive a 50% 
reduction for the next 
2 years 
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APPENDIX I( Cont'd) 
2) Income tax rates Export-oriented or technologically advanced 
Nationwide SEZs ~~ETDZs~~ Pudong New 
development 
Area 
15 % in any year they 10% upon the expiry of income Same as Same as ETDZs 
export more than 70% tax exemption if an export- ETDZs 
of their output oriented enterprise and 
technologically advanced FIEs 
qualify for 50% reduction for 3 
years after expiry of exemption 
Open Coastal Cities Open Coastal Economic Areas FTZs High-Tech Zones 
125 in any year FIE Same as ETDZs Same as Same as Open 
exports more than ETDZs Coastal Cities 
70% oftheir output; 
technologically 
advanced FIEs qualify 
for 50% reduction for 
3 years after the 
expiry of exemption | 
3) Non-manufacturing enterprise in Service Industry 
Nationwide SEZs ETDZs Pudong New 
Development Area 
hicometax 30% — 15% 15% 15% 
Tax No FIEs investing over US$ Same as SEZs Same as ETDZs 
exemption exemption 5 mil. with terms of at 
least 10 years qualify for 
tax exemption for the 
first profit-making year, 
following by a 50% 
reduction for the next 2 
years(7.5% tax rate) 
FTZs Open Coastal Cities High-Tech ~~Open Coas ta l~ 
Zones Economic Areas 
bicome tax 24% 30% 15%, but rate is lWo 
subject to locality 
Tax Same as Same as ETDz Same as ETDZs Same a ETDZs 
exemption ETDZs 
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APPENDK I( Cont'd ) 
4) Income tax refunds for Fffis with reinvested profits 
40% tax reftind paid on profits reinvested or used to establish other enterprises for at 
least 5 years is applied nationwide. 
5) Local income tax rates 
Generally, 3%( 10% of national tax rate ) is levied nationwide, but it is subject to 
locality in special areas. 
Source : Richard Brecher, "Considering the Options." The China Business Review. 
May-June 1995, pp 10-19. 
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APPENDK n 
EVVESTMENT OPTIONS FOR FOREIGN EVVESTORS 
1) Joint venture 
Type ofjoint venture Details 
Equity joint ventures l)Limited liability companies and legal-person status 
(EJV) 2)Minimum shareholding of 25% by foreign partner 
3)Various tax and other incentives are offered 
4)Most popular to companies focusing on sales in the China's market 
Cooperative joint l)Business partnerships in which each party cooperates as a separate 
ventures 
…n,、 legal entity and bears its own liabilities 
( C J V ) 
2)The difference is the CJV's profits and assets are shared as 
specified in the contract- not necessarily according to the percentage 
of each partner's share of total investment like EJV 
3)Frequent in the resource exploration and construction sectors 
2) Wholly foreign-owned enterprises 
This is the commonest form in the export-oriented and high-technology 
areas. A foreign investor receive all profits and bears all risks. A higher standard is 
required by approval authorities. This form has been especially encouraged during 
periods of domestic credit restriction because it doesn't include any financial input 
from Chinese side. 
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3) Other investment options 
Types Details 
Limited l)Hold legal-person status and raise capital by issuing shares( similar to JV) 
comply 2)bicludes a supervisory board( serve as watchdog for interests of shareholders 
and employees ), and a Board of directors( 3-13 persons, government officials 
may not serve, and quorum of 1/3 of directors required for board decisions ) 
3)No limits on transfer of shares between shareholders, but transfers to non-
shareholder require consent of majority of existing shareholders 
Joint stock l)At least 5 promoters or initial shareholders and shares may be listed on China's 
company exchanges, so numbers of shareholders can vary greatly 
2)Licludes a supervisory board to protect shareholders and employees right, and a 
Board of directors( 5-19 persons, government officials may not serve, and quorum 
of 1/2 of directors required for board decisions ) 
3)Transfers must be made through a securities exchange. 
4)Promoters may not transfer their shares until 3 years after establishment of 
company, and directors, general managers, supervisors may not transfer their 
shares during their terms of office 
Source : Preston M. Torbert, "Broadening the scope of investment." The China 
Business Review. May-June, 1994, pp 48-55. 
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THE STEPS EV THE APPROVAL PROCESS JN CHEVA 




Value more than ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " Value less than 
US$ 30 Mil * US$ 30 Mil 
MOFTEC ~~|j COFTEC ~j| 
‘ > , 
Feasibility study I 
Value more than . . Value less than 
US$ 30 Mil ‘ US$ 30 Mil 
MOFTEC ~ j | COFTEC ~ j j 
* Jf WFOE Contract and articles | 
application and ofassodation | 
articles of association 
Issue ofbusiness | 
license | * When contract and articulates are 
approved, an application for approval 
1 including including all documents 
Business registration | involved in the above procedures 
I should be submitted to AIC(Local 
" " " • " • " • ^ administration of industry and 
commerce) to register the venture and 
receive a business license 
Source : Daniel Martin, "Signing on the Dotted Line”，The China Business Review. 
May-June 1995, pp 26-31. 
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Project proposal 
Proposal outlines the Chinese entity's plan to seek foreign investment, and 
should not only specify the need for foreign investment but also detail the type of 
foreign technology sought. Proposal is drafted and submitted by the Chinese side. 
MOFTEC( Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ) 
It is located in Beijing. Its approval is necessary i f the value of a project is more 
than US$ 30 million or i f the investors intend to establish a holding company. 
COFTEC 
They are local MOFTECs and located in most cities. They, also known as local 
trade bureaus or foreign investment office, At the local level, foreign companies deal 
primarily with the local COFTECS. 
Letter of intention 
Although it is not required or legally binding, it provides a foundation for the 
subsequent feasibility study. 
Feasibility studv 
Both parties prepare a feasibility study that informs the local planning 
commission of the proposed project's details such as equity shares of the partners 
involved, the product(s) to be produced, the location and scope of the venture, the 
marketing information, labor and land-use requirements, need for loan, expected taxes, 
tariff, and fees, etc. This study is very crucial to both parties because it can serve as a 
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